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In their book Davor Pećnjak and Tomislav Janović address two central 
issues in philosophy of mind. In chapters 1-5, they investigate the most 
fundamental properties of mental states and their mutual relationships. In 
chapter 7-15, they investigate the mind body problem that, notoriously, 
concerns the relation of the mind with the physical world. Both lines of 
investigation are carried forward mostly by engaging with current 
contemporary analytic philosophy of mind. However, when appropriate, 
they refer to classic continental philosophers, mostly in the 
phenomenological tradition. 
 
Following a consolidated tradition in philosophy of mind, the Authors 
consider intentionality and phenomenal character as the fundamental 
properties of mental states. Intentionality is the property of being about 
something. Thus, for instance, the belief that the sun is hot is intentional 
insofar it is about the fact that the sun is hot. Usually, it is said that the 
belief has the content that the sun is hot. Pećnjak and Janović, referring to 
the work of Christopher Peacocke, that is primarily inspired by that of 
Gareth Evans, recognise the existence of mental states with non-conceptual 
content (Chapter 4). So, they might be saying that the dog is smelling a 
toast burning, without having to assume that the ascribed representation, 
that is, this specific way of representing an event, requires that the dog has 
the concept of toast or that of burning. 
 
The Authors characterise phenomenal character as what it is like to have a 
certain conscious mental state. Thus, for instance, when we are having a 
conscious experience of a colour, there is a specific way that characterises 
our having that experience of colour. 
 
In particular, the Authors maintain that phenomenal character characterises 
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a fundamental dimension of mental states that cannot be reduced or 
explained in terms of mechanisms that render accessible a certain internal 
state to a certain cognitive mechanism. 
 
The rejection of the reducibility of the phenomenal character of mental 
state to its intentional properties is one of the important claims in Chapter 
2. Thus, the Authors oppose representationalism. This is the view that the 
phenomenal character of an experience is identical or is fixed by its 
intentional properties. Representationalism has many supporters in 
contemporary analytic philosophy, including some that would like to 
naturalise phenomenal character by naturalising intentionality (Michael 
Tye, Fred Dretske and Gilbert Harman). 
 
The Authors maintain that all mental states have a phenomenal character 
(Chapter 3). They show that this is the case for beliefs and other 
propositional attitudes. They refer to epistemic feelings such as those that 
are supposedly accompanying phenomenal character of intentional mental 
states. By relying on the phenomenological tradition, they introduce the 
notion of non-sensory phenomenal character to spell out the phenomenal 
character that they think is associated with conceptual intentional states. 
A central thesis of the book is that a mental state can be intentional only if 
it has or can potentially have a phenomenal character, and thus it is 
conscious (Chapter 3). The existence of intentional mental states that 
cannot have a phenomenal character is denied. This is a quite strong thesis 
that challenges central assumptions in contemporary cognitive science. In 
fact, central explanatory strategies in this discipline, as for example in the 
study of perception, learning, memory and language, refer to the 
assumption of the existence of sub-personal computational mechanisms 
that operate on unconscious representations. This explanatory paradigm 
has also inspired the postulation of non-conscious non-conceptual content 
that the Authors appears to recognise only in its conscious form.  
 
Their exploration of the relationship of phenomenal character and 
intentionality covers also the issue whether, as stated by the so-called 
higher order thought theories of consciousness, what confers to a mental 
state its phenomenal character, and thus its being conscious, is being the 
object of a higher order thought (Chapter 5). The principal target of their 
criticism is the account offered by Peter Carruthers.  
 
Regarding the mind body problem, the book advances a dualism of 
properties. This ontological view is reached after a criticism of 
eliminativism, the doctrine that our ordinary conception of mental states 
and their features will be replaced by mature neuroscience (Chapter 6) and 
an historical excursion into traditional arguments for dualism (Chapter 7). 
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Further the Authors offer, and in some cases endorse, several very 
influential and some less influential contemporary arguments for the 
dualism of properties. Respectively, Richard Swinburne’s arguments 
based on the metaphysics of properties and events (Chapter 8), the 
conceivability arguments by Saul Kripke and David Chalmers (Chapter 9), 
the knowledge argument by Frank Jackson (Chapter 10) and the argument 
form simplicity by David Barney (Chapter 11). These arguments are aimed 
at showing that consciousness involves properties that are not physical 
properties. Given the primacy that the Authors give to consciousness in 
fixing intentionality, if follows that this latter feature is not physical as 
well. 
 
In addition, the Authors, by relying on the work of Crawford Elder, 
elaborate a general ontological view that accommodates their account of 
the mental in a multi-layered view of reality. In Chapter 13, they oppose 
the view that all mental processes are computational ones, that, in 
principle, could be emulated by a computer. Chapter 14 engages with the 
mysterianism of Colin McGinn, who maintains that although 
consciousness is a natural phenomenon it is impossible for us to understand 
how this is so. The Authors contend that there is no a good reason why 
McGinn should couple this latter thesis of cognitive closure with 
materialism. Instead, they argue that it would combine better with dualism. 
Although, as stated in the introduction, Tomislav Janović does not endorse 
substance dualism as Davor Pećnjak does, Chapter 15 offers some 
arguments to fend off reasonings that highlight the difficulties in the 
individuation of immaterial substances. 
 
It is impossible to critically engage with a book of such a width that touches 
upon so many different interrelated topics. I would like just to focus on the 
Authors’ criticism of representationalism. In fact, this appears to a be 
turning point in the first part of their book. Their further accounts of the 
relationships between intentionality and phenomenal character depends on 
this view. 
 
They respond to the argument from the transparency of experience that 
some representationalists have used to support their view (Harman, Tye). 
This argument can be taken as involving two steps. First, it is argued that 
introspective evidence does not show that that our experiences have a 
phenomenal character, because we are not aware of our experiences. For 
instance, in seeing a red surface we are not aware of the experience of red, 
instead we are aware of a surface that appears to be red. Second, what we 
are aware of is what the experience represents the world as being. For 
instance, in seeing a red surface we can only be aware of what it represents, 
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in this case a surface that is red. That is, we can only be directly 
introspectively aware of the representational content of the experience.  
One response by the Authors, that is worth quoting entirely, is the 
following: 
 
First, we believe that this type of complaint simply misses the target, 
i.e. it does not refute what we are trying to show in this chapter. 
Namely, we do not see how the argument of transparency of 
experience – which, note well, also relies on the introspective 
evidence, only interpreted differently – could dispute such a 
fundamental, most directly available fact that every conscious state, 
unlike its unconscious version, has a phenomenal or qualitative 
component, no matter that this phantom entity, at least under normal 
circumstances, cannot be introspectively identified and analysed as 
a separate part of the mental state, independent from its intentional 
content. (Pećnjak and Janović, 2014: 21)1 
 
This remark seems to be methodologically unfair to representationalists 
insofar it is made by the Authors who, in the initial part of the book, declare 
their allegiance to first-personal methods in the study of the mind. 
Moreover, in no place they specify the peculiar observational conditions 
under which phenomenal character can be shown to be separable from 
intentional content.  
 
However, the Authors offer also positive arguments or indirect evidence to 
prove the independence of phenomenal character from intentional features 
of the experience. In one of them, they compare a perception of a house 
with the mental image of the same house (p. 21). They conclude that the 
difference between the two experiences, in terms of intensity, clarity, and 
richness of detail must be in the phenomenal character of the experiences 
and not in their intentional features (probably, because both are about the 
same house).  
                                                 
1  English translation by the author. The original in Croatian is: “Kao prvo, 
smatramo da ova vrsta prigovora jednostavno promašuje metu, tj. da ne opovrgava 
ono što nastojimo pokazati u ovom poglavlju. Naime, ne vidimo kako bi se 
argumentom transparentnosti iskustva - koji se, nota bene, također oslanja na 
introspektivnu evidenciju, samo drugačije interpretiranu27 - mogla osporiti tako 
temeljna, na najizravniji mogući način dostupna činjenica da svako svjesno stanje, 
za razliku od svoje nesvjesne inačice, ima neku fenomenalnu ili kvalitativnu 
komponentu, bez obzira što taj fantomski entitet, barem pod uobičajenim uvjetima 
nije moguće introspektivno identificirati i analizirati kao zaseban dio mentalnog 
stanja, nezavisan od samog intencionalnog sadržaja.” (Pećnjak and Janović, 2014: 
21) 
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It is not clear why such a difference is not about the ways in which the two 
experiences represent the world as being. Consider that besides the first 
perception P1 of the house there is also, after a short time, a second 
perception P2 of the same house under the same visual conditions. It seems 
plausible to say that P1 and P2 are representing the house with a similar 
degree of correctness and that it is greater than that of the mental image. 
Now, such a representational difference can only derive from the similarity 
and difference in intensity, clarity and richness of detail of these 
experiences. Thus, we might conclude that these latter properties are 
representational features of the experiences. 
 
It cannot be replied to this that intensity, clarity, and richness of details are 
phenomenal characters that fix the representational properties of the 
experiences. This, of course, is consistent with the Authors’ account of the 
foundational role of consciousness in intentionality. However, this reply 
would require exhibiting the further intentional properties of the 
experience that are so fixed by their phenomenal character. At least 
introspectively, it seems that no other properties, besides the supposed 
phenomenal characters that could ground the representational differences 
and similarities mentioned above, are in sight. 
 
Despite my reservations above, it must be acknowledged that Pećnjak and 
Janović have written an impressively wide-ranging book that touches upon 
several central contemporary debates in contemporary philosophy of mind 
and in relevant areas of metaphysics. They scholarly address these issues 
and advance clear positions with well-developed arguments. In the first 
five chapters, where the fundamental features of mental states and their 
mutual relations are investigated, the book offers a very original discussion 
and frames in an innovative and intriguing way a significant fragment of a 
philosophical theory of the mind. The second part, chapters 7-15, relies on 
an accurate selection of contemporary arguments and the Authors present 
and discuss them forcefully. One interesting and completely original 
feature of the book is the use in many places of the predicate logic to 
analyse the available theoretical positions and the relevant concepts. This 
confers a great level of clarity and precision to many discussions in the 
book.  
 
Overall, the most important feature of the book is that, with their 
opposition to in necessarily non-conscious representations and to the 
possibility of characterising mental states computationally, the Authors 
offer an alternative paradigm that challenges a wide range of theories and 
research programmes in contemporary cognitive sciences. Although the 
book will not convince everyone that their challenge cannot be met, surely 
their arguments should not be ignored.  
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In conclusion, the book offers to any expert in the field of philosophy of 
mind the possibility of engaging with a well-articulated and far reaching 
philosophical view on the nature of the mind that is developed by engaging 
with several streams of contemporary discussion. Advanced philosophy 
students, who are at least familiar with predicate logic, beside the original 
position of the Authors, will find in this book a useful point of entry into 
several important contemporary debates within the analytic philosophy of 
mind and well-chosen pointers to relevant views also within the 
phenomenological tradition. 
